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Demand in cobalt has been surging in recent years due to advancements in technology and the 
requirements for batteries. Mining of minerals like cobalt is often associated with conflict. This 
paper investigates if cobalt can be related to conflict by replicating the work of Berman, et al. 
(2017) and finds mixed results. Thus, minerals are distinguished into labor- and capital-
intensive ones, which yield findings similar to Dube and Vargas (2013). This is done through 
classification of main minerals and heterogeneous effects. The paper concludes that cobalt can 
be regarded a labor-intensive resource and therefore decreases the likelihood of conflict. 
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1. Introduction 
Battery powered devices are becoming an almost inevitable luxury in all parts of the world. 
While cellphone adoption is becoming stronger in the developing parts of the world, 
environmental considerations drive forward the market demand for electric vehicles in 
wealthier countries. What many of these devices have in common is a lithium-ion battery. A 
crucial ingredient to this type of battery is cobalt, which has seen strong increases in demand 
due to the afore mentioned developments and has ever rising demand projections. Most of this 
mineral is mined in the conflict prone Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
Given the relatively unstable political and socio-economic environment in the DRC, such stark 
changes in demand for cobalt can have severe consequences for the country. This work attempts 
to shed light on some of said consequences. Cobalt mining is often portrayed as exploiting local 
communities and workers, disregarding safety measures of miners, polluting the environment, 
fostering child labor and having a generally negative impact on Congolese miners. However, 
with rising prices it also has the potential to bring increased income to households and 
communities and thereby drive the economic development of local communities as well as the 
entire DRC. There is a widespread association among scholars between mining and conflict in 
respective areas, especially in resource rich sub-Saharan Africa. However, this topic is seldom 
formally discussed with regard to cobalt specifically. On one hand, rising prices could lead to 
increased opportunity costs of conflict. On the other, it could drive grievances and tensions 
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among communities as well as artisanal miners and large mining operations. An interesting 
characteristic of cobalt is that it is extracted in different ways. While capital-intensive large-
scale mines commonly extract cobalt as a by-product, labor-intensive artisanal mines contribute 
a significant portion to the minerals’ total extraction volume.  According to Dube and Vargas 
(2013), the impact of natural resources on conflict can be different depending on whether they 
are capital or resource intensive. Thus, this paper attempts to answer the question of what 
impact the price of cobalt has on the probability of conflict in mining regions. 
To investigate this question, geo-coded historical data on conflict from the Armed Conflict and 
Event Data (ACLED) is analyzed. The dataset provides information on timing and locations of 
conflict as well as the involved parties and type of conflict. The latter information proves 
especially useful as it allows for a more granular interpretation of cobalt’s impact on conflict. 
ACLED data is merged with observations on the locations of and main mineral produced by 
mines according to geo-referenced 0.5 x 0.5 degree (ca. 55 x 55 km) cells. The methodology 
applied follows closely the one of Berman, et al. (2017) but reveals somewhat different results. 
The crucial distinction is the more granular view provided as well as the application of a new 
mining dataset which includes cobalt and the focus on a single country. 
Overall, this research finds a negative relationship between changes in the price of cobalt and 
the likelihood of conflict. While Berman et al. (2017) find an overall positive relation between 
changes in mineral prices and conflict, the work at hand shows that these results can differ when 
disaggregated by minerals and types of conflict. The results are distinguished into three types 
of conflict, battles, violence against civilians, and protests. Other than Berman et al. (2017), this 
work finds a significant negative relationship between cobalt prices and battles as well as 
protests. Although insignificant, the relationship to violence against civilians appears negative 
as well. Assuming that cobalt is largely sourced from labor-intensive artisanal mines, this 
relationship is in line with the opportunity cost mechanisms introduced by Dube and Vargas 
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(2013). The assumption is verified throughout this paper. This paper adds to the researchers 
work by showing that a resource does not need to be fully labor intensive to have negative 
impacts on conflict. Certain resourced can be extracted in either labor- or capital- intensive 
manners. What this paper shows is that if a large enough share of a resource is sourced in a 
labor-intensive manner the results of Dube and Vargas (2013) hold. To add validity to the 
presented results, the work of Berman, et al. (2017) is replicated for the DRC. Their results only 
hold to a certain extend in this context. Additionally, the results indicate that the opportunity 
cost and rapacity channels hold for artisanal and industrial mines, as these have different 
impacts on the likelihood of conflict. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a literature 
review of previously conducted research on the impacts of mining, its impact on conflict as 
well as the impacts of cobalt by itself. Further, arguments for the increasing importance of 
cobalt for the DRC are put forward. The third section describes the context of this study in more 
detail. More precisely, it points out the importance of cobalt for the DRC as well as the risk and 
history of conflict in the region. Data and respective sources are discussed in section four. While 
the baseline dataset is made available by Berman, et al. (2017) for replication of their results, 
the extension of cobalt required additional mining and price data. Also, a further dataset is 
employed to distinguish between capital and labor intensity of different minerals. Section five 
points out the implemented estimation strategy. It argues for the validity of prices as exogenous 
variables that can explain the relation between mining and conflict. In section six the results of 
the conducted analysis are presented. Interestingly, this work finds that the impact of mining 
can differ according to the type on conflict as well as the type of mining. The last section draws 




2. Literature Review 
It exists a wide array of academic work that focuses on the overall impact of mining on a variety 
of different measures in resource rich countries. These range from household consumption 
(Bazillier & Girard, 2019), poverty (Fisher, et al., 2009), corruption (Knutsen, et al., 2016) to 
conflict (Berman, et al., 2017, Dube & Vargas, 2013, Maystadt, et al. 2014). The last is where 
the work at hand positions itself. 
Dube and Vargas (2013) develop a model that distinguishes capital- and labor-intensive 
resources and their respective impact on conflict. Their model is largely based on two opposing 
channels through which changes in resource prices may impact conflict, opportunity costs and 
rapacity. Generally, if a resource is labor intensive there are higher opportunity cost for 
engaging in conflict when the price for that resource increases. On the other hand, higher prices 
may make capital intensive resources more profitable and therefore more prone to appropriation 
by armed groups who use proceeds to finance their fighting. The latter is coined the rapacity 
effect.  The focus on the mining industry allows the distinction of two extraction methods, large-
scale mining (LSM) and small-scale and artisanal mining (ASM). These can be regarded as 
capital- and labor-intensive, respectively since LSM requires major up-front investments while 
ASM often makes use of rudimentary tools and techniques. The German Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) finds that up to 20 percent of all cobalt extracted in 
the DRC is mined in small scale and artisanal mines (BGR, 2017). Potentially, this share of 
labor-intensive extraction is enough for the opportunity cost mechanism to work. On the other 
side, capital-intensive industrial large-scale mining is often criticized for embracing political 
formalizations that solidify state control, failing to reduce poverty and driving corruption, and 
thereby creating tensions that can lead to further conflict (Verweijen, 2017; Geenen and 
Cuvelier, 2019). This would support again the findings of Dube and Vargas (2013) in terms of 
the mining industry. 
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Berman, Couttenier, Rohner, and Thoenig (Berman et al., 2017) conduct a comprehensive study 
on the impact of mining activity on the likelihood of conflict for the entire African continent. 
They find a significant and generally positive relation between mining and the occurrence of 
conflict at the local level. In their work they argue that large parts of violence across African 
countries can be explained by rising mineral prices. An important mechanism in this regard is 
the feasibility effect. That is, a rise in mineral prices makes conflict more feasible, as resources 
appropriated by fighting groups become more profitable and thereby lower financial hurdles to 
fighting. The analytical framework of this paper follows closely the research conducted by 
Berman et al. (2017). 
 
The existing literature on the economic, social and political of cobalt mining is plentiful. 
However, most of this work is qualitative and often lacks empirical evidence. Sovacool (2019) 
employs expert and community interviews as well as natural observations to investigate how 
cobalt is extracted as well as the risks and benefits of cobalt mining (Sovacool, 2019). Among 
other effects, the author points out the inherit risk of conflict that cobalt mining brings with it. 
Conflict is mostly inflicted by tensions either among communities when new mining cites are 
discovered and displacement occurs (World Bank, 2007) or between large scale mines and 
artisanal miners over concessions (Tsurukawa et al., 2011). Additionally, tensions occur due to 
corruption in the local mining-police, weak local governance or rent-seeking traders (Sovacool, 
2019). 
Some of these tensions are explored by Maystadt, et al. (2014) who analyze the impact of 
mining concessions on the number of conflicts in different spatial nuances and find mixed 
results (Maystadt, et al., 2014). According to them, mining concessions have no impact on 
conflict on a territory level, but foster conflict on a district level. Such spillover effects are a 
common finding in conflict literature and are therefore also included here. The authors construct 
a theoretical model in which entrepreneurs invest in the protection of their mining sites, 
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lowering territorial conflicts, while grievances drive conflicts on a district level. These 
grievances can be related to the displacement of miners that occurs when new mining cites open 
in neighboring districts.   
The demand for cobalt has been surging over the last decade. The rise of electric vehicles (EVs), 
the broader adoption and more frequent replacement of cellphones all contribute to this rising 
demand (Globalenergymetals.com, 2020). That is because all those afore mentioned are yet 
depended on lithium-ion batteries, which contain cobalt. Not only are these products becoming 
more popular and wider adopted, they also require ever increasing amounts of energy which in 
turn requires larger batteries (Reuters, 2020). 
3. Context 
While these advancements in technology have a wide array of benefits from reducing allegedly 
reducing the carbon footprints (EVs) to putting great computing power into the hands of a 
majority of consumers and even coordinating democracy movements, there are some downsides 
as well. Fast paced technological development makes technologies become outdated very 
quickly. In 2017 the global average replacement rate for smartphones was 21 months 
(Counterpoint, 2017). Not only does this produce large amounts of electronic waste, but it 
drastically increases the demand for minerals like cobalt, that are more often than not extracted 
under conditions unimaginable to the end-users of such products. 
To put into context the importance of cobalt mining and conflict in the DRC is elaborated next. 
Cobalt mining in the DRC dates back to the times of Belgian colonization (Honke, 2010). In 
the decades following the country’s independence, cobalt mining was largely monopolized by 
state owned Gécamines (Al Barazi et al., 2017). During the first Congolese war between 1996 
and 1997, cobalt mines were expropriated by rebel forces, in order to gain international support 
in their pursuits against the Mobutu regime. After accomplishing this goal, the new government 
led by Laurent Desire Kabila faced militant forces from neighboring countries, trying to 
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overthrow his government once again in the second Congolese war from 1998 to 2003 
(Amnesty International, 2016a). The raging chaos left Gécamines largely inoperable giving rise 
to artisanal mining operations which from 1999 gained recognition by the national government 
as means to generate income in terms of income taxes from miners and mining companies as 
well as the issuing of mining permits. Despite later efforts to attract international investment 
and thereby driving artisanal miners out of their territories, an estimated 20 percent of 
Congolese cobalt is mined in artisanal mines (BGR, 2017).  
With rising demand for cobalt in electronic goods, the DRC is gaining importance as the world’s 
top supplier of the mineral. Roughly 60 percent of cobalt are mined in the DRC (Reuters, 2018). 
While such a position might at first seem promising to the developing country’s economic 
success, it might inherit some social costs. In the race to secure deposits and gaining access to 
the countries limited extraction capacity, conflict is prone to develop. This conflict could be 
between rivaling firms as well as among the population. Reasons for civil conflict in this context 
are plentiful. First, local populations might fear the expropriation of land through foreign 
companies and investors, who extract the lands riches without benefiting local communities 
appropriately. Second, these grievances might not only be directed at the companies themselves 
but also towards political parties as local communities might perceive outside investments as 
“selling out their land”. Third, conflict might be driven by the lootability of artisanal mines. 
With rising prices, certain groups might be more inclined to forcefully gain access to mining 
sites or storage depots. 
The large share in worldwide cobalt production, frequent violent events, relatively unstable 
institutions and low prosperity for Congolese citizens make the DRC a prime subject in the 
analysis of cobalt’s impact on conflict. Artisanal mining is often subject to little oversight in 
terms safe practices or protection from extortion. Additionally, the lack of domestic capital in 
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the DRC requires outside investments making the country subject to potential exploitation and 
according grievances. 
4. Data 
The data used in this analysis builds on the data framework of Berman et al. (2017). The 
researchers combine conflict data from the Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) 
with mining data from Raw Material Data (RMD) as well as price data from the World Bank  
on the basis of the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) gridded location data. This paper 
extends the dataset by adding mining data and respective prices. To do so, some additional 
datasets were employed for mines, prices and mining characteristics. Simultaneously, the 
dataset was reduced to include only observations regarding the DRC. The specifics of each 
dataset are discussed below. 
Conflict data – ACLED distinguishes types of conflicts according to reports and does therefore 
not solely rely on proxies such as a threshold on casualties. These events include violence 
(political or non-political), protests as well as non-violent events by political agents. The 
distinction between types of conflict is important to this paper because, as it turns out, cobalt 
mining has different effects of different kinds of conflict. A main channel for this is that 
different kinds of conflicts are initiated by different political actors (i.e. government forces, 
civilians protesting, terrorist groups).  
Location data is referenced using a 0,5 × 0,5 degree (55 × 55 km) grid as provided by the Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (Tollefsen, Strand & Buhaug, 2012). To ease the analysis of this 
enormous panel dataset a dummy variable is created that is one if at any time during a given 
year conflict occurred in a respective cell. This allows to analyze the impact of mining on 
conflict while ignoring the dynamics of conflict onset. If conflict is already appearing, a change 
in minerals prices is unlikely to have a particular impact on its onset. 
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The way ACLED collects data might create a bias towards certain countries, regions or events 
with better media coverage (Berman et al., 2017). By focusing on only one country much of 
this bias is ruled out. Some small chance remains that events in rural areas are reported less 
frequently or accurately. However, since most mining operations are located in specific rural 
areas, media coverage can be assumed to be equivalent throughout mining regions and does 
therefore not disturb results. This smaller dataset reduces overall heterogeneity compared to 
that of Berman et al. (2017). 
Raw Material Data – Berman et al. (2017) use data from IntierraRMG which contains the 
location, minerals produced, total production as well as the start of production and current 
activity. The most important variable extracted from this dataset is a dummy variable that is 
one if at least one mine is active in a specific cell during a given year. In addition, the researchers 
identify one of 14 minerals as the main mineral of a cell. The main mineral is defined as the 
most produced mineral over the entire period of observation. The number of included minerals 
is limited by the availability of price data in the World Bank’s commodity price databank 
employed by the researchers. Berman at al. (2017) identify that 70 percent of the mining cells 
they identify produce a single mineral and 96 of production value stems from the identified 
main minerals. It is important to note however, that this applies to the whole of the African 
continent.  Since the work at hand focuses on only a single country, there might be some 
difference in the relative importance of certain minerals. In the case of the DRC, cobalt becomes 
an important mineral that is excluded in the work of Berman at al. (2017). Figure 1 below shows 
the export value of cobalt from the DRC relative to other metals for the entire observation 
period.  
Additionally, the researchers established a set of proxies to create interaction terms for capital 
intensive mining. The distinction between capital- and labor-intensive mining is crucial to the 
arguments made in this paper. Accordingly, a further proxy was introduced using information 
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on artisanal and industrial mining taken from Global Forest Watch. The dataset is described in 
more derail later. 
Figure 1 – Metal exports from the DRC between 1997 and 2010. 
 
Source:  Observation of Economic Complexity. The export value of all metals from the DRC 
is represented as a share of total metal export value in a given year. It is apparent that cobalt 
is of extraordinary importance for the Congolese metal industry. 
(https://oec.world/en/visualize/stacked/hs92/export/cod/all/show/1997.2010/) 
A concern that Berman at al. (2017) point out about IntierraRMG dataset is that it only includes 
mines operated by major companies and could therefore lead to some “attenuation bias”. This 
concern might be even more valid given the smaller sample. However, mines can be assumed 
to be spatially clustered and therefore small mines are likely to be included in the employed 
mining dummy. The IPIS dataset used to supplement the original mining data has a focus on 
small and artisanal mines and therefore contributes to eradicate the concern of potential 
exclusion of small mines. The specifics of IPIS data are discussed next. 
Cobalt data – is sourced from the International Peace Information Service (IPIS). IPIS is an 
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one of their projects focuses on the mapping of artisanal and small-scale mining in the eastern 
DRC (IPIS, 2010). Here they provide information on the exact location (latitude and longitude) 
of the mines as well as primary, secondary and tertiary minerals mined. Data on latitude and 
longitude is easily linked to PRIO grid cells. The data on the extracted minerals is then used to 
construct a dummy variable for the extraction of cobalt in a respective grid.  The IPIS data is 
used to complement the original dataset of Berman et al. (2017) and represents the main 
contribution of this work in terms of data.   
A major drawback of this dataset is that it does not give any detailed information on the activity 
of mines, i.e. whether a mine is operational or not. One way to adjust for this is to only add the 
information on main minerals to Berman et al.’s (2017) dataset where the presence of mines 
does not change over the observed time period (SD(mines) = 0). Another way is to assume that 
the mines from the IPIS dataset are open during the entire period from 1997 to 2010. The impact 
of this on the accuracy of the dataset is negligible as changes the standard deviation of mines 
from 0,116 to 0,114. Since the latter approach yields more observations on mining it is 
employed throughout this work.  
Mining concessions – Global Forest Watch provides a dataset of mining concessions which is 
sourced from the Congolese Ministry of Mines Mining Registry (CAMI). While the original 
dataset is only available for purchase, the abstracts used by Global Forest Watch are freely 
available. The data was used mainly in the construction of Table 3 and the distinction between 
capital- and labor-intensive mining. Congolese mining authorities distinguish between the 
methods used in mining when providing permits. This allows to analyze which minerals have 
a greater share in artisanal, small scale and industrial mining relative to other minerals. A 
precise overview is provided in the appendix (Table A2). Given that the arguments on conflict 
mechanisms made here rely strongly on the distinction between capital- and labor-intensive 
mining, this data provides a better proxy than the one employed by Berman et al. (2017). 
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Minerals Prices – Berman at al. (2017) use World Bank commodity prices at real 2005 US$ as 
price for the minerals included. While there is little to question about the quality and 
applicability of the data, it is limited to 14 of the observed main minerals. The researchers 
complement World Bank prices with data from Rapaport and the US Geological Survey 
(USGS) for diamonds and tantalum, respectively. Diamond and tantalum prices are not 
included in the World Bank commodity prices and the USGS provides US unit values rather 
than world prices. In the baseline model applied by Berman et al. (2017), diamonds and 
tantalum are hence excluded. The researchers show that adding these observations does not 
strongly affect their results. However, given the smaller, more focused dataset applied in this 
study, diamonds and tantalum change the outcomes significantly. Therefore, these minerals are 
included in the analysis at hand. 
Cobalt Prices – While the World Bank’s commodity “pink sheet” provides yearly prices for 
most of the considered minerals, some prices needed to be sourced elsewhere. A similar 
approach was taken by Berman at al. (2017) for the price of tantalum and diamonds. The United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) provides an extensive list of yearly observations of mineral 
prices. From this list the prices of cobalt, tantalum and manganese were taken. The real prices 
in this dataset are in constant 1992 US$, which is different from the World Bank prices used by 
Berman at al. (2017) (2005 US$). However, the USGS provides the price deflators used in the 
calculation of real prices, which allows to reverse engineer the real prices from this dataset to 
fit the one of Berman at al. (2017).  
5. Estimation Strategy 
 A major problem in estimating the impact of mining on conflict is potential reverse causation. 
It is possible that mines cause conflict, however conflict can also have an impact on the activity 
of mines (miners might engage in conflict rather than resuming mining or larger mine activities 
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might be affected in other ways). A distinction between these effects can be made by the 
direction of the correlation. If mines cause conflict one would expect a positive correlation 
between the two and vice versa for the case of conflict affecting mining activity. However, 
Dube and Vargas (2013) argue that different resources can have different impact on conflict, 
depending on whether a resource is labor or capital intensive in its production. Mining can take 
both forms. Certain minerals are easily extracted from the ground using rudimentary tools such 
as pickaxes and shovels and can thus be considered labor-intensive. Others require the deeper 
explorations in the form of mining shafts or extremely costly large-scale open mining casts; 
hence they are capital-intensive. Furthermore, certain minerals might only be profitable if 
mined in large quantities that require high degrees of automation. Table 3 shows that there are 
distinctions between both types of mining and their impact on conflict.  
Berman et al. (2017) address causation by focusing on exogeneous variations in the value of 
mines. This value is determined as the value of the main mineral sourced in a specific cell. The 
researcher’s pursuit the idea that rent seeking increases the likelihood of violence and that it is 
large for more valuable mines. Conveniently, world prices of minerals are mainly determined 
by the demand and are therefore exogeneous. In the case of cobalt in the DRC this exogeneity 
is challenged since close to 60 percent of world supply stem from this country. However, it is 
unlikely that conflicts in one particular grid cell in the DRC will impact the world price of 
cobalt (Maystadt, et al., 2014). Hence the main specification of the model at hand takes the 
following form: 
(1) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝛼1(𝑀𝑘𝑡 × ln 𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑊) + 𝛼2(𝐶𝑘𝑡 × ln 𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑊) + 𝑭𝑬𝑘 + 𝑭𝑬𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡, 
Where (𝑘, 𝑡, 𝑗) represent cell, time, and the type of conflict, respectively. 𝑭𝑬𝑘 and 𝑭𝑬𝑡 describe 
cell and year fixed effects. 𝑀𝑘𝑡 is the described dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
at least one mine is active in a cell during a given year. 𝐶𝑘𝑡 is another dummy variable that is 
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one if cobalt is mined in a cell. Finally, 𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑊 describes the world price of cell 𝑘’s   main mineral 
during year 𝑡. The reason why only interaction terms are included is the 𝑀𝑘𝑡 is either zero or 
one for the entire sample and is absorbed by the fixed effects when not included in the 
interaction term. Further, the covariates of ln 𝑝𝑘𝑡
𝑊 and the interaction term become identical. 𝛼2 
is the main coefficient of interest, as it represents the impact of a change in cobalt price on the 
likelihood conflict. 
Causality is established in several ways. First, 𝛼1 is determined under the condition of mines 
being open during the entire observation period (SD(mines) = 0). This controls for the effects 
that conflict can have on mining activity (opening/closing). Second, by including cell fixed 
effects, time invariant co-determinants of mining and conflict, such as political instability or 
inefficient enforcement of property rights are controlled for in each observed cell. Third, year 
fixed effects serve the same purpose for time variant factors such as war. 
An important notion that the ACLED dataset allows to control for is that the types of conflict 
might vary depending on who engages in conflicts.  Governments can use force against civilians 
while civilians may protest or form anti-governmental militant (terrorist) groups. Typically, the 
triggers for such conflicts will differ depending on the source of conflict. Terrorist attacks are 
likely to be differently motivated than civil protests. Given these differences in the source of 
conflict one can argue that (different types of) mining can have different impact on different 
kinds of conflict. In the work at hand, the events reported by ACLED are divided into three 
categories, battles, violence against civilians and protests. The last one includes riots. In the 
case of cobalt, being a labor-intensive mineral, one expects grievances to be larger if major 
companies misappropriate land or are perceived to exploit local citizens. On the other hand, 
governments are likely to be in support of large companies investing into their economy. From 
this, one could expect the presence of a major company to increase the likelihood of protest as 
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well as violence against civilians. The feasibility mechanism and the easy access to ASMs 
would argue for a positive relationship between battles and cobalt mining. 
6. Results 
The first step in the analysis of cobalt mining on violence is to replicate the work of Berman et 
al. (2017) for the subsample of the DRC. Their original work finds positive correlations between 
mining and the likelihood of conflict for the whole of Africa. Table 1 presents the results for 
the DRC. 
Table 1 – Replicating Berman et al. for DRC only. 
 
Battles Violence against 
civilians 
Riots / Protests 
 Within Cell Spillovers Within Cell Spillovers Within Cell Spillovers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








ln price × mines >0 0,192** -0,018 -0,021* -0,083** -0,023 0,041 
 
(0,096) (0,021) (0,036) (0,035) (0,052) (0,035) 
ln avg cell price                 
× mines >0 
-0,173**  -0,034  0,039  
 (0,083)  (0,037)  (0,063)  
ln prices × mines in  0,054**  0,071*  -0,002 
Neighboring cells  (0,023)  (0,037)  (0,004) 
       
Observations 10.640 9.646 10.640 9.646 10.640 9.646 
Notes: * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in 
parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation in a 100km radius and infinite serial correlation. All 
estimations include year and cell fixed effects. Variables: mines > 0 is a dummy variable that is 1 if a mine 
was observed at some point during the observation period and 0 otherwise; ln price mainmineral is the 
natural log price of the mineral with the highest production over the observation period for each mining 
cell at real 1997 prices and is zero for non-mining cells; ln avg cell price is the natural log average price 
for a cells main mineral at real 1997 prices during the observation period; mines in neighboring cells is a 
dummy variable that is 1 if mines are observed in any of the neighboring cells of degree 1 and 2. 
 
The results are split across the three different types of violent events and limited to observation 
from the DRC. The table shows that a variation in the price of a mineral have a significant 
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impact on the likelihood of battles (column 1) and violence against civilians (column 3). While 
the results for battles are in line with the original work, the results for violence against civilians 
and protests paint a different picture. These results are obtained from the observation of those 
mining cells that were active during the entire observation period (SD(mines) = 0).  
Interestingly, mining does not seem to significantly affect civilian uprise (riots/protests). A 
possible explanation for these non-significant results are opportunity costs that miners face 
when engaging in protests instead of engaging in mining activity. This interpretation explains 
to a certain extent the negative correlation between violence against civilians and mining. 
Without civil unrest there is no need for government forces to intervene. An alternative 
interpretation is that the likelihood of violence against civilians is lower in mining areas 
compared to non-mining areas. This can be explained by possible grievances and/or lower 
opportunity costs in said areas. Column 2, 3 and 4 show potential spillover effects from mines 
in neighboring cells. Spillovers are significant and positive for both, battles and violence against 
civilians. The coefficients for spillover effects are generally lower compared to within cell 
effects indicating that the source of conflict is largely caused by forces within those cells. This 
positive correlation might be driven by forceful appropriation of land, as argued for by the 
feasibility and rapacity effect. 
Table 2 below shows that cobalt mining in itself is a strong determinant for the likelihood of 
conflict in the respective mining areas. Contrary to Berman et al. (2017) cobalt mining is found 












Riots / Protests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ln price × mines >0 0,025 -0,029 0,036 
 
(0,025) (0,020) (0,037) 
    
Cobalt × lprice -0,090* -0,049 -0,014** 
(0,054) (0,035) (0,006) 
    
Observations 10.556 10.556 10.556 
Notes: * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors 
in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation in a 100km radius and infinite serial correlation. 
All estimations include year and cell fixed effects. Variables: mines > 0 is a dummy variable that 
is 1 if a mine was observed at some point during the observation period and 0 otherwise; ln price 
is the natural log price of the mineral with the highest production over the observation period for 
each mining cell at real 1997 prices and is zero for non-mining cells; Cobalt is a dummy variable 
that is 1 if cobalt is mined in a cell at any point over the observation period. 
 
While the results for the cobalt interaction term are all negative (as expected for minerals mined 
in ASMs) only results for battles and protests are significant. A possible reason why violence 
against civilians does not show significance are incidence involving the mining police 
(Sovacool, 2019). These are likely to disturb the otherwise negative relationship between cobalt 
mining and conflict. One can argue that the opportunity costs argument of Dube and Vargas 
(2013) holds for battles and protests. With an increase in the prices of cobalt, miners would 
miss out on greater profits from their work by not mining. Thus, they will prefer to engage in 
mining cobalt rather than engaging in protests or joining armed forces against the government 
which reduces incidence. However, for this argument to hold cobalt would need to be a labor-
intensive resource. This paper argues that the distinction between labor- and capital-intensive 
minerals can be made by its most prevalent mining type. ASM can be considered as labor-
intensive and LSM as capital-intensive. Figure 2 provides an overview of which minerals are 
more frequently mined under ASM or industrial mining permits. Data was extracted from the 
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Global Forest Watch dataset, that lists mining permits and the respective minerals mined. The 
illustration shows that cobalt at roughly 26 percent, together with lead (24 percent), copper (26 
percent), zinc (29 percent) and diamonds (44 percent) is extracted in ASMs relatively more 
often than other minerals. 
Figure 2:  Share of ASM permits by mineral. 
 
Source: Global Forest Watch. The figure represents the relative frequency of mining permits 
under which specific minerals are mined. 
If the framework of opportunity costs and rapacity effects of Dube and Vargas (2013) applies 
to artisanal and industrial mining, one can expect different results from both types in terms of 
their respective impact of conflict. To investigate this, two dummy variables were constructed 
that are one if a mineral could be considered to be mined either using ASM or LSM and zero 
otherwise. Mines extracting minerals that are defined as ASM operate under artisanal, tailing 
or small-scale mining permits in at least 26 percent (copper) of all mining permits recorded by 
the National Forest Watch dataset. LSM minerals are mined under industrial permits in at least 
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exclusively under large-scale permits). Cobalt is excluded from this analysis, to show that it is 
not the main driver of these effects. Table 3 shows the results for impacts of industrial and 
artisanal mining on the battles, violence against civilians and protests, respectively.  







ln price × industrial 0,027*** -0,016*** 0,001 
 (0,006) (0,006) (0,002) 
ln price × artisanal 0,008 -0,039* 0,037 
 (0,022) (0,022) (0,038) 
 







Observations 10.584 10.584 10.584 
Notes: * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors in 
parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation in a 100km radius and infinite serial correlation. All 
estimations include year and cell fixed effects. Variables: mines > 0 is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
a mine was observed at some point during the observation period and 0 otherwise; ln price is the 
natural log price of the mineral with the highest production over the observation period for each 
mining cell at real 1997 prices and is zero for non-mining cells; industrial is a dummy variable with 
value 1 is the main mineral of a cell is mined under industrial mining permits at least 82% of cases 
and 0 otherwise; artisanal is a dummy variable that is 1 if a cells main mineral is mined under 
artisanal, small-scale or tailings permits in at least 26% of all cases and 0 otherwise. The equality of 
coefficients is tested using a Wald-test for equivalence of hypotheses. 
 
 
As presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 3, there are significant correlations for different types 
of mining and conflict. While industrial (capital intensive) mining has a significant and positive 
effect on battles, there are no significant effects of artisanal (labor intensive) mining (column 
1).  For violence in column 2, both industrial and artisanal mining have negative and significant 
effects. However, the effect of artisanal mining is significantly stronger (p < 0,05) than that of 
industrial mining. Both effects follow the argumentation of Dube and Vargas (2013), that labor-
intensive resources lower the likelihood of conflict by increasing opportunity costs.   
 To support these results some proxies for artisanal and industrial mining are evaluated in Table 
4.  Following Dube and Vargas (2013), one should expect opposite effects of industrial and 
ASM operations on conflict, where industrial mining proxies will increase the likelihood of 
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conflict while the opposite should be true for ASM proxies. Some of these proxies are 
elaborated upon in table A1 in the appendix. 
Table 4 – Impact of artisanal mining proxies on conflict. 
 Battles Violence Riots 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
ln price                
× mines >0 
0,024*** 0,023 -0,011** -0,001 0,000 -0,001 
(0,006) (0,034) (0,005) (0,005) (0,001) (0,004) 
     × above avg                
luminosity 
-0,071*  -0,058  -0,009**  
(0,041)  (0,049)  (0,005)  
      × Major 
company 
 0,011  0,386***  0,642*** 
 (0,056)  (0,035)  (0,030) 
Observations 10.570 182 10.570 182 10.570 182 
Notes: * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. LPM estimations. Conley (1999) standard errors 
in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation in a 100km radius and infinite serial correlation. 
All estimations include year and cell fixed effects. Variables: mines > 0 is a dummy variable that 
is 1 if a mine was observed at some point during the observation period and 0 otherwise; ln price 
is the natural log price of the mineral with the highest production over the observation period for 
each mining cell at real 1997 prices and is zero for non-mining cells; above avg luminosity is a 
dummy variable that is 1 if nightly light emission in a cell is higher than average in the DRC and 
0 otherwise; Major company is a dummy variable that is 1 if a company that is among the top 10 
producers of the main mineral is present in a mining cell and 0 otherwise. The explanatory value 
of above avg luminosity and Major company is elaborated in Table A1. 
 
Average luminosity is amount of nightly light emission as a yearly average for a given cell. 
Generally, luminosity is a good indicator for population density as well as access to electricity. 
Here, average luminosity has some predictive power for the likelihood of a mineral being mined 
artisanal or industrial as shown by table A1. The correlation is positive for artisanal mines and 
slightly negative for industrial mines.  This is intuitive as highly automated mines require less 
labor and will therefore not attract surrounding communities. At the same time, these mines 
might force mining communities out of a given cell when opened, as mining grounds might be 
“taken away” by the operators of large-scale mines. Artisanal mining on the other hand is 
fostering the creation of communities. ASMs are typically welcoming newcomers (Bazillier & 
Girard, 2019) are thereby provide good job opportunities (mostly for young men). In addition, 
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these mining communities will benefit from proximity to their mining sights, driving up the 
correlation between luminosity and small scale mining.   
The share of the main mineral in the total production in a cell is negatively related to the 
likelihood of a mine being artisanal. Likely this is caused by the de-centralized character of 
artisanal mines. ASM miners might either individually specialize in certain minerals or extract 
a broader array of minerals, all of which represent some value. Large scale mines on the other 
hand might have a greater focus on singular minerals for which their machinery is specialized. 
Presence of a large company increases the likelihood of a mineral being mined by ASMs. This 
is likely explained by lower costs of entry for artisanal miners. Specifically, the presence of a 
large mining company allows miners to sell extracted minerals more easily. Large distance to 
mining companies requires means of transportation for extracted goods which might go along 
with higher capital intensity. Even if a logistical network is in place, it is likely that ASMs in 
proximity to major companies are serviced more frequently and easily. A further explanation 
could be that major mining companies focus on regions in which minerals are abundant and 
easily accessed, which also eases market entry for artisanal miners.  
As shown in column 1, above average luminosity is negatively correlated with the likelihood 
of battles. This is in line with the observations in table A1 as well as the concepts of Dube and 
Vargas (2013).  Above average luminosity is an indicator of ASM operations, which are 
expected be negatively correlated with the likelihood of conflict. 
Columns 2, 5 and 8 show the effects of the presence of a major company in a mining cell for 
battles, violence against civilians and protests, respectively. Strong significant effect can be 
seen in columns 5 and 8. In the logic of Dube and Vargas (2013) and in light of table 3 this 
appears counterintuitive. Since in table A1 the presence of a major company has a positive 
impact on the likelihood that a mineral is mined in ASMs, one would expect this factor to be 
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negatively correlated with conflict. However, grievance due to perceived expropriation of land 
and the employment of mining police are likely to be stronger in the presence of major 
companies and to spark riots and violence against civilians, respectively (Sovacool, 2019).  
7. Conclusion 
This work analyzed the impact of cobalt mining on conflict in the mining regions within the 
DRC. With rising demand for cobalt due to faster development in technologies, especially 
batteries, cobalt is experiencing large spikes in price. Mining is widely considered to be a 
driving force of conflict, especially when combined with weak institutions as often seen in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The question this paper investigates is how fluctuations in prices of cobalt 
impact conflicts. To do so, it borrowed data from Berman et al. (2017) as well as concepts from 
Dube and Vargas (2013) to estimate the likelihood of different types of conflicts for changes in 
the price of cobalt. In several steps it was validated that the works of Berman et al. (2017) only 
partially hold for the sub-sample of the DRC and for specific minerals that are known to be 
mined on an either large-scale or ASM basis. Since cobalt is often found to be mined in ASMs, 
according to Dube and Vargas (2013) one should expect a price increase to reduce the 
likelihood of conflict in mining regions. The presented results show an overall negative impact 
of cobalt mining on conflict. This holds true for two distinct types of conflicts, battles and 
protests. It is easy to argue that, especially for these types of conflict the opportunity costs 
mechanism holds. Nonetheless, results were insignificant for violence against civilians, which 
is likely an indication of weak policy measures towards the regulation of mining as well as 
corruption in mining regions. Implications of the presented results include the encouragement 
of artisanal mining in the DRC, through easier access to mining permits as well as sound 
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Average cell luminosity 0,122*** -0,051***  
(0,015) (0,006) 
Share of main mineral  -0,587*  
(0,302)  
Major company 0,326***  
(0,058)  
Observations 2.370 2.370 
Notes: * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01. LPM estimations. Conley 
(1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation in 
a 100km radius and infinite serial correlation. All estimations include 
year and cell fixed effects. Variables: industrial is a dummy variable 
with value 1 is the main mineral of a cell is mined under industrial 
mining permits at least 82% of cases and 0 otherwise; artisanal is a 
dummy variable that is 1 if a cells main mineral is mined under artisanal, 
small-scale or tailings permits in at least 26% of all cases and 0 
otherwise; above avg luminosity is a dummy variable that is 1 if nightly 
light emission in a cell is higher than average in the DRC and 0 
otherwise; Share of main mineral is the share that the main mineral 
contributes to the total mining production of a mining cell in year 𝑡. 
Major company is a dummy variable that is 1 if a company that is among 












Table A2 – Mining permits by mineral 













Copper 73,42% 16,03% 8,44% 2,11% 
Aluminum 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Lead 75,68% 16,22% 8,11% 0,00% 
Tin 86,67% 13,33% 0,00% 0,00% 
Nickel 93,75% 6,25% 0,00% 0,00% 
Zinc 70,91% 23,64% 5,45% 0,00% 
Gold 82,98% 16,60% 0,43% 0,00% 
Platinum 87,50% 9,38% 3,13% 0,00% 
Silver 87,50% 8,65% 3,85% 0,00% 
Iron 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Coal 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Phosphate 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Diamond 55,93% 39,55% 0,00% 4,52% 
Cobalt 74,14% 15,52% 8,19% 2,16% 
Source: Global Forest Watch 
 
